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THEORETICAL BASES OF ADMITIING AGENT'S DECLARATIONS MADE AFTER THE EVENT AS EVIDENCE AGAINST
HIS PRINCIPAL IN PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS
In the event that an action is brought against a principal for
personal injuries or wrongful death it is often necessary to determine whether a declaration by his agent who was involved in the
allegedly tortious occurrence, made after termination of the event,
is admissible in evidence against the principal. This presents a
perplexing problem in view of the existing decisions. It is perhaps
true that with regard to no other question are the judicial solutions
and the reasons offered therefor more unsatisfactory in principle.
While it may be apparent to one who peruses the cases that much
of the obscurity in the reasoning of the courts is due to their indiscriminate use of the phrase res gestae, there is also, the writer believes, a real misunderstanding concerning what principles can
serve as reasonable grounds for the admission of such evidence. It is
the purpose of this note to explain three distinct principles which
have been referred to in cases determining the admissibility of this
type of evidence; to show that only one of these can reasonably be
said to justify its reception in cases of the kind here considered; and
to demonstrate that this one applicable principle has been overlooked
by some courts in reaching a decision. The principle referred to is
that which justifies the admission of spontaneous exclamations.
The following facts, although hypothetical, are useful to illustrate the type of situation out of which the instant problem arises.
"A" who is employed by "P" as a truck driver, while driving upon
"P's" business, strikes a pedestrian inflicting serious injuries. Immediately after the impact he jumps from the truck and with the
help of a bystander carries the injured man to a house abutting the
street. On the way to the house the bystander remarks, "You must
have been blind if you didn't see this man." In response "A" says,
"I guess I just wasn't watching the road." Thereafter the injured
man institutes an action for personal injuries against "P" predicated
on the alleged negligence of his driver. He seeks at the trial to introduce the above declaration of "A" by means of the testimony of
the bystander to prove that "A" was not careful in the respect indicated by his statement. "P" objects to the admission of the declaration on the ground that it constitutes mere hearsay.
In order to rule intelligently upon the objection of "P" it is
necessary that the court examine the principles upon which the
Hearsay Rule rests. It may be said with reasonable precision that the
rule excludes declarations offered for the purpose of proving the
truth of the facts asserted therein,' when such declarations were
16
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not made under circumstances which impart to them a judicially
recognized circumstantial probability of trustworthiness, and when
offered in evidence in a manner which precludes opportunity to the
party against whom they are offered to cross-examne the declarant.'
It appears that the real basis of the rule is to be found in the conviction of courts that it is unfair to the party against whom such
statements are offered and unproductive of justice to admit them
without the safeguard of cross-examination unless the circumstances
under which the statements were made warrant a probability of
trustworthiness sufficient, in the opinion of the courts, to justify
dispensing with that safeguard. The rule does not rest upon doubt
as to the truth of the witness' testimony, as he is under oath and
subject to cross-examination, but upon misgivings regarding the
accuracy and veracity of the declarant who is not before the court.
It is important to notice that the rule does not exclude all declarations "heard said," but operates only on those offered to prove the
truth of the assertions therein, e.g., those offered for their testimonial value.' This attitude toward untested statements offered for their
truth seems sound in view of the frequency with which maccuracies
and falsehoods are exposed upon cross-examination by skillful
lawyers.
How then does the Hearsay Rule relate to the hypothetical case
supra? It is obvious that the declaration sought to be introduced by
the plaintiff is hearsay inasmuch as it was heard said. It is equally
apparent that the declaration is offered for no purpose other than
to prove the truth of the assertion contained therein, e.g., that "A"
failed to look where he was going. In addition it appears that declarant, "A," does not testify in court to the facts stated, but that his
declaration is offered in evidence by another who heard it. Except
for the principle which will now be explained it would appear the
statement should be rejected as objectionable hearsay.
PRINCIPLE ADMITTING SPONTANEOUS EXCLAMATIONS

Declarations of the sort known as spontaneous exclamations or
declarations are admitted in evidence although they constitute hearsay and although they are generally offered as evidence of the truth
of the facts asserted therein. This is because the courts have found
in the circumstances of their utterance a probability of trustworthiness. Wigmore lists the following as requisites of a spontaneous exclamation: "(1) A startling occasion (2) A statement made before
time to fabricate (3) Relating to the circumstances of the occur5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE sec. 1422 (3d ed. 1940).
United States v. Macomb, 26 Fed. Cas. 1132, No. 15702 (C.C.D.
Ill. 1851), 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE sec. 1362 (3d ed. 1940).
'Terry v. United States, 51 F 2d 49 (C.C.A. 4th 1931), 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE sec. 1766 (3d ed. 1940).
6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE sec. 1766 (3d ed. 1940).
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rence."' The theory upon which spontaneous exclamations are admitted is not complicated. It is thought that a statement made by one
who was at the scene of an exciting occurrence, spontaneously and
under the influence of the occasion, before the mind has had opportunity to become sufficiently detached to reflect or to falsify is
likely to be true. Thus there is a probability of trustworthiness, the
product of the circumstances under which the statement was made.
It has been said that the facts must speak through the person, not
the person about the facts. Many circumstances must often be considered in order to determine whether a statement is, in fact, spontaneous. Courts usually consider the amount of intervening time
between the occurrence and the making of the statement of importance as bearing on the question of spontaneity' Whether the
declarant was himself injured and suffering when he spoke is
another circumstance which might reasonably be noticed The fact
that the declarant was at the time of speaking, and at all time prior
thereto after the occurrence, laboring under great responsibility has
influenced one court to hold admissible his declaration made two
hours after the occurrence?' In another case the declaration of one
made eight days after the occurrence was admitted as spontaneous
because prior to the utterance thereof the declarant had remained
unconscious." Time, it appears, is but one consideration. Usually
spontaneous declarations are made by a participant in the occurrence,
but they have been received when made by bystanders.' If spontaneity is the test it should make no difference by whom the spontaneous declaration is uttered. In deciding whether a given declaration
is spontaneous it has generally been said that the trial judge should
be accorded much discretion."
In reference to the hypothetical case supra the principle governing the admission of spontaneous declarations would appear clearly
applicable. Nevertheless, in some cases involving very similar circumstances, the courts have apparently neglected this principle entirely, attempting to decide on admissibility by applying one or the
other of two dissimilar principles which, it will hereafter appear,
could not reasonably be found to supply a ground for admissibility,
'6 Id. sec. 1750.
Cromeenes v San Pedro L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 37 Utah 475, -, 109
Pac. 10, 15 (1910).
MCKELVEY, EVIDENCE sec. 278 (5th ed. 1944).
Rothrock v. City of Cedar Rapids, 128 Iowa 252, 103 N.W 475
(1905)
' Walters v Spokane International Ry Co., 58 Wash. 293, 108
Pac. 593 (1910).
'Britton v. Washington Water Power Co., 59 Wash. 440, 110 Pac.
20 (1910).
"Armborst v. Cincinnati Traction Co., 25 F 2d 240 (C.C.A. 6th
1928), New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Kovatch, 120 Ouo St. 532, 166
N.E. 682 (1929).
"'Walters v. Spokane International lRy Co., 58 Wash. 293, 108
Pac. 593 (1910) MCKELVEY, EVIDENCE sec. 279 (5th ed. 1944).
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nor grounds, in themselves, for rejection of the evidence. The courts
have apparently decided these cases upon the principles admitting
verbal acts' and vicarious admissions. 5 It is believed that these
principles should not ordinarily be decisive in such cases.
PRINCIPLE ADMITTING VERBAL ACTS
The concept of the verbal act cannot be cast immediately aside
in a note concerned with the admissibility of agents' declarations
made after the occurrence and sought to be introduced against the
principal in personal injury actions. Although clearly the verbal act
doctrine is not likely to be applicable under such circumstances, and
certainly cannot be applicable under the facts of the hypothetical
case supra, its unwarranted influence can be discovered in some of
the cases. It is typical of verbal acts that the making of the statements is an act which has in itself legal significance in the case
without regard to the truth of the facts asserted in the statement.'
In other words, the truth of the statement is immaterial, and the
statement is not offered in evidence to prove the truth of the facts
stated, but for some other purpose. The statement is relevant regardless of its truth. Such utterances are classified by Wigmore as
follows: "(1) words the utterance of which is a fact forming part
of the issue (e.g., words of a contract or a slander) (2) words uttered at the time of doing a material equivocal act, and forming
part of the total conduct which determines the legal significance of
the act (e.g., words of ownership-claim accompanying the occupation of land) (3) words used circumstantially as Indirect evidence
(e.g., words of notification as evidence that the person notified re-

ceived knowledge)

."

It will be seen that statements of this sort are not objectionable
within the Hearsay Rule stated supra because they are not offered for
their truth; their truth does not matter. In an action for slander a
necessary element of proof is that the allegedly slanderous words
were spoken. Before any question of the truth or falsity of the facts
asserted by the words can arise it must be shown that they were
uttered. How could this be proved except by one who heard them?
If title to land by adverse possession is claimed, a statement by the
occupant while in possession that he owns the land, whether this be
true or false, is relevant to show that he claimed the ownership and
thus held adversely to the claimed rights of another. Whenever
knowledge is a fact to be proved the fact that words of notice were
spoken to one alleged to have had knowledge is indirect evidence
tending to establish that he was aware of the matter concerning
14

Norris v Interurban St. Ry. Co., 90 N.Y.S. 460 (1904).

"Morse v Consolidated Ry Co., 81 Conn. 395, 71 Atl. 553 (1908).
6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE sec. 1772 (3d ed. 1940)
6 Id. sec. 1746.
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which the words were spoken. In each case the words are inportant
regardless of their truth; they are independently relevant.
In order that a statement can be properly admitted as a verbal
act the following have been considered requisites: "
(1) There
must be a main or principal act, relevant under the issue, the significance of which needs to be made definite; (2) the words must
genuinely elucidate or give characterto this act; (3) the words must
be by the actor himself, not by another person; and (4) the words
must be precisely contemporaneous with the act. '
It is because the situations with which this note is concerned,
like the hypothetical case supra, involve statements offered for their
truth and for no other purpose, and because the statements were
made after the act, not contemporaneously with it, that the verbal
act concept cannot properly be regarded as a ground for removing
such statements from the prohibition imposed by the Hearsay Rule.
Having seen that the statement in the hypothetical case cannot
qualify as a verbal act, it may be queried whether it might be admissible under another theory that of the vicarious admission.
PRINCIPLE ADMITTING VICARIOus ADMISSIONS

McKelvey defines evidential admissions as follows:
"The evidential admission is the statement by a
party (at some previous time) of a fact inconsistent with
a fact attempted to be established by him at the time of
trial; a statement which, when brought into the case,
comes in as a piece of evidence, direct or circumstantial,
testified to by a third party from which the court and
jury may draw an inference as to the truth of the fact in
issue."'"

It may be said that admissions of parties are always receivable.'
One theory treats admissions as outside the scope of objectionable
hearsay on the ground that a party having made a statement which
by chance operates against his interest at the time of trial cannot
object to its reception as evidence, for the reason that he has no
standing in common sense or law to complain that he has had no opportunity to cross-examine himself. -' A contention to that effect offered by the declarant himself would seem ridiculous. Another is
predicated upon the "against interest" or "estoppel" elements which
are thought to furnish a probability of trustworthiness in that one
would not be expected to make statements against is own interest
unless they are true.' However this may be, it is not a question
within the scope of this note.
116 Id. sec. 1752.
'MMCKELVEY, EVIDENCE sec. 83 (5th ed. 1944).
4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE sec. 1048 (3d ed. 1940)
' Ibid.

MCKELVEY, EVIDENCE sec. 89 (5th ed. 1944).
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In order that a declaration can be properly called an admission
it must have been, in contemplation of law, that of a party to the
suit.' It will hereafter appear that the statement need not, in fact,
be made by a party- under certain circumstances it may be made by
the party's agent in which case the law will attribute the statement
to the party so that it constitutes his own admission. Here a principle of substantive law of Agency is superimposed upon a principle
of the adjective law of Evidence to create what is known as a
vicarious admission. By authorizing his agent to perform certain acts
the law says that the principal has authorized any statements which
are naturally and usually associated with the doing of such acts.
Mechem lists the following requirements which must be met before
the statement of an agent will be deemed in law that of his principal:
(1) That the making of the statements or admissions of the class of those in question can fairly be regarded as incident to the act authorized to be done. If
there was no occasion to say anything
of the sort in
question, there can be no foundation for their admissibility (2) They must be made by an agent authorized to act
with reference to the subject matter. (3) The statements,
representations or admissions must have some inherent
and rational relation to the subject matter of his agency
(4) And the statements, representations or admissions
must have been made by the agent at the time of the
transaction, and either while he was actually engaged in
the performance or so soon after as to be in reality a part
of the transaction."2 '
It is also said in substance that the statement must have been
made by the agent while acting within the scope of his employment,
regarding some act within the scope of his authority, which was incomplete at the time.- That a statement which is a narrative, in that
it relates to some act already completed and past, is not to be regarded as the admission of the principal is substantiated by the decisions.- The authority of an agent to make statements may be express or it may be implied as a usual and natural concomitant of the
authorized act to which it relates.'
When authority is found the
statement becomes that of the principal, and because it is so regarded, it becomes an admission which is receivable under the ordinary rules of evidence relating to admissions.
It seems apparent that a statement like that in the hypothetical
case supra could not reasonably be held to constitute a vicarious ad' Laidlaw v Sage, 2 App. Div. 375, 37 N.Y.S. 770 (1896).
2

2

MECHEm,

A

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY

sec. 1783 (2d ed.

1914)
' Franklin Bank v Penn. D. & M. Steam Navigation Co., 11 G. &
J. (Md.) 28, 33, 33 Am. Dec. 687 (1839)
- Morse v Consolidated Ry Co., 81 Conn. 395, 71 Atl. 553
(1908) Marsh v. South Carolina Railroad Co., 56 Ga. 274 (1875).
- 2 MEcHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY sec.

ed. 1914).

1348 (2d
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mission for- at least two reasons. The act to wich it relates, the driving of the truck, or perhaps the collision, with the plaintiff, had
terminated when the statement was made. And it cannot be said
that the statement was a usual or natural concomitant of any act
the agent was authorized to perform. In brief, it might be said the
statement was completely unnecessary to performance of any duty
within the scope of the agent's authority
Having examined the principles upon which spontaneous exclamations, verbal acts, and vicarious admissions of agents are admissible in evidence one finds that only the first type can be said
to furnish a proper ground for admitting a statement made under
circumstances similar to those in the hypothetical case aforesaid. The
spontaneous exclamation principle would seem, in the final analysis,
to be that upon which the issue of admissibility should be decided.
Unfortunately the cases do not always show recognition of this
principle.
In Morse v. Consolidated Ry. Co.,2 ' an action for wrongful death,
statements made by a motorman two or three minutes after the decedent had been taken from beneath his street car were held inadmissible. The court without discussing spontaneity said that the
agent was not authorized to make admissions after the event had
passed, and that the statements were inadmissible as constituting a
narrative. Thus the court talked exclusively in terms of the vicarious
admission principle. Again, in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. Louis
Railroad Co. v. Theoboldn the court discussed the case in terms of
the agency principle. The facts were that after the plaintiff was injured in falling from a streetcar someone asked the brakeman why
he had not pushed the plaintiff harder to which the brakeman replied that he would have if the plaintiff hadn't "caught to something." The court holding the statement inadmissible said, "Neither
the declaration nor admissions of an agent, made after the event to
which they refer has transpired, can be received as evidence to bind
the principal unless they are so immediately connected therewith as
to become a part of the res gestae." Not only does this court talk in
terms of vicarious admission, but it offers an alternative ground for
possible admissibility, that is, the declarations might be admissible
if they had been found to be a part of the res gestae. Res gestae has
been used to connote spontaneous exclamations,' verbal acts, " and
the time during which the agent has authority to make vicarious
admissions.' Since the court offered res gestae as an alternative to
the vicarious admission principle as a possible ground for admitting
81 Conn. 395, 71 Atl. 553 (1908)
-'51 Ind. 246 (1875)
Leahy v. Cass Ave. & F G. Ry Co., 97 Mo. 172, 10 S.W 58
(1888)
"Cooper v The State, 63 Ala. 80 (1879).
'Vidksburg & Meridian Railroad Co. v. O'Brien, 119 U.S. 90, 7
Sup. Ct. 118, 30 L. Ed. 299 (1886)
L.J.-6
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the statements which it rejected, and said nothing about spontaneity,
it might be assumed it referred to the verbal act principle which
has already been discarded in this note as inapplicable where the
statement is offered to prove the truth of the facts asserted therein,
or where the act and the statement elucidating it are not contemporaneous. But the important consideration is that the court did not
recognize the spontaneity principle. Does this not indicate a failure
to recognize the third side of an essentially trilateral problem with
the result that the only real possibility for admitting the evidence is
ignored?
In sharp contrast to the foregoing cases is that styled Walters v.
Spokane InternationalRy. Co.' where the spontaneity principle was
recognized and utilized to admit the evidence in a rather extreme
case- There a train had been derailed, fatally injuring the engineer
and brakeman, so that the conductor became responsible for the
care of the injured men and all other matters pertaimng to the
train. Immediately after the wreck he ran one mile to a telephone to
notify the railroad company He then walked back to the train and
the dying crewmen. He was followed by the occupant of the farmhouse at which he had placed the telephone call, this man arriving
at the train approximately two hours after the wreck took place. It
was then that the conductor stated to him that the wreck had been
caused by a bad rail and that the track was defective. The court
ruled that the lower court did not err in admitting the statements as
spontaneous declarations although two hours had elapsed between
the wreck and the utterances, apparently resting its decision on two
grounds: (1) the trial judge has much discretion in determining
whether a statement is spontaneously uttered, and (2) the great
responsibility under which the conductor labored at the time might
be considered a circumstance indicating that his mind was not in a
condition to reflect or fabricate. While it is quite possible to differ
with the decision on the merits, the case definitely demonstrates that
the court recognized the applicability of the spontaneous exclamation principle and used it. Other cases involving agents' statements
made after the fact show that the spontaneous exclamation principle is a recognized ground for admissibility"
Whether the courts which do not utilize spontaneity as a test in
cases involving declarations of agents fail to do so because of lack of
precedent in that class of cases, or because they feel that the principle cannot justly be applied to agency cases, or because the idea
has not come to mind, the writer does not know. But in view of the
fact that spontaneous exclamations have been received from mere
58 Wash. 293, 108 Pac. 593 (1910)
Bessierre v. Alabama City, G. & A. Ry Co., 179 Ala. 317, 60 So.
82 (1912) Cincinnati, L. & A. Electric St. R. Co. v Stable, 37 Ind.
App. 539, 76"N.E. 551 (1905) Powe v. Pittsburgh R. Co., 303 Pa. 533,
154 AtI. 795 (1931).
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bystanders,' and from childreh 'nthere
appears to be no good reason
why those of agents should be excepted. A principal should have no
better protection from unfavorable evidence than any other partythat he should, has never been contended. But the ground upon
which statements of the sort here considered have sometimes been
admitted, that is, that they are a part of the res gestae, and the accompanying comments which make no mention of spontaneity, would
seem to indicate that some courts either confuse the spontaneous
declaration with the verbal act which is a statement not offered for
its truth, or else they do not know upon what rational basis they
admit the evidence.
In conclusion, it is submitted that declarations by agents :made
after the event and offered to prove the truth of the assertions contained therein should not be rejected by the courts without regard to
the possibility that they were perhaps spontaneous declarations, admissible for that reason. It is further submitted that to replace the
term res gestae with an equivalent explanation in English would be
to eliminate much uncertainty in the law.
NORRIS W

REIGLER

'Armborst v Cincinnati Traction Co., 25 F 2d 240 (C.A.A. 6th
1928)
"New Yoik, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Kovatch, 120 Ohio St, 532, 166
N.E. 682 (1929).

